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CASENOTES
DOES TIME ECLIPSE CRIME? STOGNER V.
CALIFORNIA AND THE COURT'S DETERMINATION OF
THE EX POST FACTO LIMITATIONS ON RETROACTIVE
JUSTICE *
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite society's natural desire to punish criminal wrongdoing,
Congress and state legislatures have historically been limited in
their ability to enact penal laws that have retroactive effects.1
The judiciary has long frowned upon ex post facto laws, which are
"statute[s] that imposel criminal liability on past transactions."2
The purpose of the prohibition is "to protect defendants from
prosecution under what was not law when they acted, but only
became law later on as a result of a new enactment by a legisla-
ture."3 Explicit provisions exist in the United States Constitution
to prevent the passage of ex post facto laws by both Congress4 and
state legislatures.5
* This casenote was the first-place winner of the 2004 McNeill Writing Competition,
sponsored by the McNeill Law Society of the University of Richmond School of Law.
1. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.9(b) (6th
ed. 2000).
2. Id.; see also Watson v. Mercer, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 88, 110 (1834) ("In short, ex post
facto laws relate to penal and criminal proceedings which [retrospectively] impose pun-
ishments or forfeitures....").
3. Ethan Isaac Jacobs, Note, Is Ring Retroactive?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1805, 1830
(2003); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES §
6.2.3 (2d ed. 2002) (noting that a law is also ex post facto "if the government retroactively
increases the punishment under a law").
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No... ex post facto Law shall be passed.").
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall.., pass any... ex post facto law
.... "). This note focuses mainly on the Constitution's ex post facto prohibition in the con-
text of state legislative enactments. However, any reference to the "Ex Post Facto Clause"
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For more than two hundred years, the judiciary has used the
four category approach proffered by Justice Samuel Chase in
Calder v. Bull to determine the applicability of the Ex Post Facto
Clauses' prohibitions to federal and state laws.6 Although Cal-
der's four bright-line categories still constitute the binding defini-
tion of ex post facto laws,7 not every ex post facto analysis can be
easily resolved by attempting to place a law into one of the four
categories.' In the early 1980s, spurred by a growing societal
awareness of and sensitivity to child abuse,9 both federal and
state governments began to enact legislation lengthening the
limitations periods for prosecuting child abuse cases.1" With laws
not always clearly fitting within one of the four Calder categories,
the practice of extending criminal statutes of limitations has been
a considerable "gray area"11 in ex post facto jurisprudence over
the past two decades.12
(singular) is meant to apply to both the state and federal provisions in the Constitution.
6. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798). Justice Chase considered ex post facto laws, pro-
hibited within the words and the intent of the Constitution, to fit into one of four catego-
ries:
1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and
which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. Every
law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when commit-
ted. 3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater pun-
ishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law
that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testi-
mony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in
order to convict the offender.
Id. For a more elaborate discussion of the four Calder categories and their treatment by
the Supreme Court of the United States, see infra Part II.B.-C.
7. See Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 521-33 (2000) (describing Calder's four cate-
gories as the relevant framework for analyzing an ex post facto issue); Collins v.
Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 46 (1990) ("But the prohibition which may not be evaded is the
one defined by the Calder categories.").
8. See R. Brian Tanner, Comment, A Legislative Miracle: Revival Prosecutions and
the Ex Post Facto Clauses, 50 EMORY L.J. 397, 404 (2001) (arguing that the Calder criteria
fail to advance a meaningful solution for uncertainties created through retroactive exten-
sions of criminal statutes of limitations).
9. See Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of Child Pornography, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 209,
211 (2001) ("[Slince the late 1970s, the problem of child sexual abuse has been 'discovered'
as a malignant cultural secret ... and elevated to the level of a 'national emergency.").
10. See Alan L. Adlestein, Conflict of the Criminal Statute of Limitations with Lesser
Offenses at Trial, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 199, 252 (1995) (explaining the trend of legisla-
tive enactments and stating that "[c]riminal statutes of limitations are thus flexible in-
struments of legislative policy and often reflect the social concerns of the particular time
and locality").
11. Tanner, supra note 8, at 434.
12. See id. at 400 (labeling the Calder categories as "notoriously unhelpful in deter-
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In 1993, California enacted a radical piece of legislation au-
thorizing the prosecution of an individual for sexual abuse of
children even when the statute of limitations previously govern-
ing the crime had long since expired.13 Although other states en-
acted similar legislation during the 1980s and 1990s, 14 Califor-
nia's prosecution-reviving statute was the only such law
consistently approved in its state courts. 15 In Stogner v. Califor-
nia," the Supreme Court of the United States overruled the
Court of Appeal of California by holding that the state statute au-
thorizing the "revived" prosecution of a seventy-eight-year-old
man for crimes that had been time-barred from prosecution for
over twenty-two years was an unconstitutional ex post facto
law.'7 The Court used Stogner as an opportunity to clarify the Ex
Post Facto Clauses' application to criminal statutes of limitations,
providing firm judicial guidance on a heated constitutional issue
that had been left chiefly to lower state and federal courts to de-
cide.' 8
This note examines the Court's decision in Stogner, including
the controversies and probable impact of the holding. Part II re-
views the history of ex post facto jurisprudence in the United
States and explains the accepted categorization standard for de-
termining ex post facto violations. Part III focuses on the Califor-
nia statute at issue, as well as the facts and procedural history of
mining whether an ex post facto violation [has] occur[red]"). Tanner further explains that
"[ciourts have consistently blurred the [Calder] analysis when deciding whether legislation
that extends a criminal statute of limitations, even to those charges already time-barred,
violates the ex post facto prohibition." Id. (emphasis added).
13. The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Leading Cases, 117 HARV. L. REV. 268, 268
(2003) (referring to CAL. PENAL CODE § 803(g) (West Supp. 2004)).
14. See generally Gary M. Ernsdorff & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Let Sleeping Memories
Lie? Words of Caution About Tolling the Statute of Limitations in Cases of Memory Repres-
sion, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 129, 150-53 (1993) (discussing legislative initiatives
by states to extend, toll, or eliminate the statutory limitation periods applicable to child-
hood sexual offenses).
15. See People v. Frazer, 982 P.2d 180, 196-97 (Cal. 1999) (holding that reviving a
time-barred prosecution does not implicate the ex post facto prohibition); see also Linda
Greenhouse, Justices Hear Debate on Extending a Statute of Limitations, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
1, 2003, at A14 (stating that other states' courts have rejected attempts by state legisla-
tures to make similar revisions to statutes of limitations).
16. 123 S. Ct. 2446 (2003).
17. Id. at 2461.
18. See Pam Smith & Jahna Berry, Cases Begin to Fall as Prosecutors, PDs React to
Decision in 'Stogner,' THE RECORDER (San Francisco), June 30, 2003, available at LEXIS,
News & Business, Recrdr File (comparing the disappointment of concerned victims' advo-
cates with the satisfaction of defense attorneys in response to Stogner).
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Stogner. Part IV analyzes the holding in Stogner, highlighting the
reasoning of the majority and dissenting opinions. Finally, Part V
discusses the implications of the Stogner decision and the revised
nature of ex post facto jurisprudence in the United States. More
specifically, this note considers Stogner's ramifications in light of
current events confronting our society, ranging from clergymen
molestation scandals to international terrorism.
II. EVOLUTION OF THE Ex POST FACTO CONSTITUTIONAL
PROHIBITIONS
A. Influence of English Common Law Practices
The modern constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto
laws owe their existence to considerations drawn from the Eng-
lish common law.19 That is not to say the Constitution's Ex Post
Facto Clauses were based on a similar prohibition under common
law. On the contrary, the authority to pass ex post facto laws in
England admittedly belonged to the king, lords, and Parliament
as "a part of the supreme power with which they ha[d] been
clothed."" The English lawmakers' exercise of personal discretion
served as the sole means to limit the practice.21 The common law
allowed for bills of attainder and similar acts to be used as "cruel
and destructive weapons of personal or political vengeance"22
against unsuspecting and often innocent people who could be exe-
cuted without any form of a trial. The existence of such vindictive
and invidious legislative practices in England served as a warn-
ing to the Framers of the Constitution-an example of how not to
model the United States' rules on retroactive criminal laws.23
The desire to safeguard United States citizens against certain
unfair common law practices likely motivated the Framers of the
19. See HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, AN ESSAY ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS
AGAINST LEGISLATION IMPAIRING THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS, AND AGAINST
RETROACTIVE AND Ex POST FACTO LAWS § 224, at 286 (1887).
20. WILLIAM P. WADE, A TREATISE ON THE OPERATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF
RETROACTIVE LAWS, AS AFFECTED BY CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS AND JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATIONS § 270, at 316 (1880).
21. Id.
22. BLACK, supra note 19, § 224, at 286.
23. See id.
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Constitution to incorporate the ex post facto prohibitions.24
Shortly after the drafting of the Constitution, the Supreme Court
articulated the importance of honoring the prohibitions against
ex post facto laws in the benchmark ex post facto case, Calder v.
Bull.25
B. The Supreme Court and Calder v. Bull's Ex Post Facto
Categorization
Decided in 1798, Calder has served as binding ex post facto au-
thority for over two centuries.26 Although the issue in Calder-
whether a Connecticut statute that overturned the decision of a
probate court and ordered a new hearing to determine the valid-
ity of a will constituted an ex post facto law27 -involved civil con-
sequences, the case was, nonetheless, monumental for ex post
facto analysis in the criminal context. 2' The concurring Justices
emphasized that the ex post facto analysis only applied in crimi-
nal cases. More significantly, the majority opinion rebuked ret-
roactive criminal punishments from the common law, expounded
upon the importance of prohibiting criminal ex post facto laws in
the United States, and devoted several pages to categorizing and
describing four types of violations.3
Early into the Court's opinion, Justice Chase acknowledged the
influence of the common law's use of harsh bills of attainder as
the impetus for incorporating the Ex Post Facto Clauses into the
Constitution.3 Justice Chase argued that the Framers' knowl-
edge of the injustice of the English common law's frequent use of
malicious retroactive laws gave them greater caution in crafting
the Constitution so as to avoid similar inequities in the United
24. See id. § 224, at 287.
25. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
26. See Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 521-33 (2000).
27. Calder, 3. U.S. (3 Dall.) at 386-87.
28. See id. at 398-99 (Iredell, J., concurring) (pointing out that only criminal laws are
subject to ex post facto scrutiny).
29. Id. at 397 (Paterson, J., concurring) (opining that the clause referred only "to
crimes, pains, and penalties, and no further"); id. at 399 (Iredell, J., concurring) ("[Tihe
true construction of the prohibition extends to criminal, not to civil, cases.").
30. See id. at 388-91.
31. Id. at 389 (noting "[tihe prohibition against... making any ex post facto laws...
very probably arose from the knowledge, that the Parliament of Great Britain claimed and
exercised a power to pass such laws" to inflict unwarranted punishment).
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States.32 After mentioning the former practice in Great Britain of
executing an individual for treason when his acts, at the time
committed, did not constitute treason, Justice Chase explained
that the federal and state ex post facto prohibitions were de-
signed "[t]o prevent such, and similar, acts of violence and injus-
tice."33
Justice Chase's justifications for strictly enforcing the Ex Post
Facto Clauses were based upon a "social compact" formed by the
people of the United States when they created the Constitution.
34
This social compact involved establishing justice, promoting the
general welfare, securing the blessings of liberty, and protecting
persons and property from violence.3 An integral part of that so-
cial compact, and of democracy as a form of government, is to "de-
termine and over-rule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legisla-
tive power .. ."36 Justice Chase held that permitting ex post facto
laws would violate the social compact, amounting to "political
heresy, altogether inadmissible in our free republican govern-
ments."37
Finally, Justice Chase recognized that the language of the pro-
hibition-that neither the state nor the federal government shall
pass any ex post facto law-necessarily required some explana-
tion.3" After all, "naked and without explanation, it is unintelligi-
ble, and means nothing."39 Justice Chase, therefore, proffered four
categories in an endeavor to "show what law is to be considered
an ex post facto law, within the words and meaning of the prohi-
bition in the Federal Constitution."40 Each category was designed
to encompass "manifestly unjust and oppressive" laws.4' The Cal-
der analysis has been interpreted such that when a statute pos-
sesses characteristics fitting into any one of the four categories,
the statute "will be as obnoxious to [the Ex Post Facto Clause] as
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 388.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 389.
38. Id. at 390.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 391.
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though it possessed them all, expressed in clear and positive
terms."42
1. Laws Criminalizing Acts Innocent When Done
Calder's first ex post facto category pertains to "[elvery law
that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and
which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such ac-
tion."43 This language could arguably be interpreted as either: (1)
describing only those actions by the criminal defendant that did
not contravene any known law at the time they were committed;
or (2) including both actions that were legal when committed and
actions that were not legal when committed but had become un-
punishable through a grant of amnesty or pardon (through the
running of a statute of limitations, for example).44 Most com-
monly, a statute fits into Calder's first category if enacted by a
legislature to remedy "past legislative errors or omissions," at-
taching criminal punishment to acts that were genuinely inno-
cent and legal when done.45
2. Laws Aggravating or Enhancing an Already Defined Crime
A statute is ex post facto under Calder's second category when
it "aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when
committed."4" This type of statute changes the character of an act,
such as changing an act that was a misdemeanor when commit-
ted to a felony after the alleged commission of the crime.47 Simi-
larly, a statute that graduates a crime to a higher criminal degree
(changing second degree murder to first degree murder, for ex-
ample) than it was when committed would be impermissibly ex
post facto under Calder's second category.' s More fundamentally,
42. WADE, supra note 20, § 271, at 316.
43. Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 390.
44. Tanner, supra note 8, at 414.
45. WADE, supra note 20, § 272, at 317.
46. Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 390.
47. WADE, supra note 20, § 273, at 318.
48. Id.
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a category-two statute inflicts a punishment upon a person not
then subject to that punishment to any degree. 9
3. Laws Retroactively Inflicting Greater Punishment Than
Originally Allowed
The third Calder category applies to "[elvery law that changes
the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law
annexed to the crime, when committed."" Category-three laws
differ from category-two laws in that the former actually pre-
scribe an additional, harsher punishment, while the latter impose
a new label on the crime, to which a more severe punishment at-
taches.51 When the statutory intent is "to add new rigors to the
punishment of old offences, the statute is declared unconstitu-
tional" under the third Calder category. 2
4. Laws Altering the Rules of Evidence in Order to Facilitate a
Conviction
The fourth ex post facto category Justice Chase provided was
for "[elvery law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and re-
ceives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the
time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the of-
fender."53 This category most often applies to situations where
under the new statute less evidence or a lesser quality of evidence
is used to convict a person than the evidence required to convict a
person for the same act at the time of the commission of the
crime. 4 Category four was founded partly on the premise that
"[t]he right of the accused to an impartial trial could never be
practically guaranteed, so long as the evidence by which his guilt
could be established was completely within the control of the law-
making power." 5
49. Id. ("[T]he enactment [of a category-two statute] simply gives to the proscribed act
a new designation, to which [a] harsher punishment has already been annexed...
50. Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 390.
51. WADE, supra note 20, § 273, at 318.
52. Id. § 273, at 318-19.
53. Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 390.
54. WADE, supra note 20, § 280, at 326-27.
55. Id. § 280, at 327.
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C. Virtual Unanimity: Ex Post Facto Jurisprudence After Calder
v. Bull
In the more than two hundred years since the Calder decision,
no case has overruled Justice Chase's four-category proposition as
being the authoritative legal framework for determining and
categorizing ex post facto violations.56 As such, there have not
been many changes in the standard for ex post facto analysis,
though several notable Supreme Court cases have discussed and
applied the Calder analysis to ex post facto determinations.
Following Calder, Cummings v. Missouri57 was the next major
case to address the Ex Post Facto Clauses.5" Cummings consid-
ered a Missouri constitutional provision enacted shortly after the
Civil War that required clergymen to take an oath declaring that
they never aided or comforted individuals sympathetic to the
South during wartime.5 9 In a strong affirmation of Calder's au-
thority, the Court began its ex post facto analysis by declaring
that Justice Chase's four categories had been "substantially
adopted as the law." 0 According to the Court, the Missouri consti-
tutional provisions assumed that there were persons in Missouri
who were guilty of some of the acts designated and, therefore, al-
tered the rules of evidence by subverting the presumptions of in-
nocence."' Moreover, the provisions were aimed at past acts, not
future acts, which helped the Court arrive at the inescapable con-
56. See David Stout, Court Limits the Prosecution of Sexual Abusers of Children, N.Y.
TIMES, June 27, 2003, at A16 (stating that, although Calder was decided in 1798, its in-
terpretation of the ex post facto prohibitions is "still regarded as definitive").
57. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866).
58. Melisa L. Rockhill, Note, Priests, Pedophiles, and Other Child Molesters: Califor-
nia Says Father Time Won't Help Them Now, 24 WHITIER L. REV. 1097, 1105 (2003).
59. Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 284. The Court felt that the relevant clauses in the
Missouri Constitution were intended:
to operate upon parties who, in some form or manner, by action or words, di-
rectly or indirectly, had aided or countenanced the Rebellion, or sympathized
with parties engaged in the Rebellion, or had endeavored to escape the proper
responsibilities and duties of a citizen in time of war; and they were intended
to operate by depriving such persons of the right to hold certain offices and
trusts, and to pursue their ordinary and regular avocations.
Id. at 327. The Court interpreted the natural effect of these clauses to be "absolute and
perpetual" deprivation of several rights enjoyed by U.S. citizens, which amounted to pun-
ishment imposed for past acts. Id.
60. Id. at 300.
61. Id. at 328. The effect of the clauses placed them squarely within Calder's fourth
category.
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clusion that Missouri was in violation of the Ex Post Facto
Clause.62
Another significant ex post facto decision was Beazell v. Ohio.63
Beazell involved an issue of misjoinder, where the Ohio statute
applicable at the time of the defendant's alleged criminal act pro-
vided for automatic severance from a co-defendant upon a motion
by the defendant. 4 Before the two Beazell defendants were in-
dicted, an amendment to the statute made severance a discre-
tionary matter with the trial court.65 The Court ultimately held
that the statute did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.66 The
Beazell holding, nevertheless, constituted further approval of
Calder's ex post facto categories as the standard for judicial
analysis. 67 Beazell, in fact, was perfectly consistent with Cum-
mings and Calder because the Ohio legislature did not enact the
statute under scrutiny to facilitate convictions that could not be
obtained without the enactment of the statute. 8 Instead, the
statute served to restore a mode of trial found to be satisfactory
at the common law.69
62. Id. at 327-28. The Court explained that "some of the acts to which the expurga-
tory oath [was] directed were not offences at the time they were committed." Id. at 327.
For example, prior to the incorporation of the constitutional clauses, it was not a crime to
leave the State of Missouri in order to avoid being enrolled or drafted into military service.
Id. Therefore, the Court opined, the clauses fit into Calder's first category by imposing a
punishment for an act not punishable at the time it was committed. Id.
63. 269 U.S. 167 (1925).
64. Id. at 168. The original statute read: "When two or more persons are jointly in-
dicted for a felony, on application to the court for that purpose, each shall be separately
tried." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 13,677 (Anderson 1921).
65. Beazell, 269 U.S. at 168-69. The amendment provided:
When two or more persons are jointly indicted for a felony, except a capital of-
fense, they shall be tried jointly, unless the court for good cause shown, on
application therefore by the prosecuting attorney, or one or more of said de-
fendants order that one or more of said defendants shall be tried separately.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 13,677 (Anderson 1926). In another section, the amended statute
applied to acts committed prior to the amendment's enactment, thereby affecting both
Beazell defendants. Beazell, 269 U.S. at 169. The Beazell co-defendants wanted two sepa-
rate trials-which, upon their motion, would have been automatic under the originally ap-
plicable statute-because their defenses would be different. Id. Furthermore, each man
argued that he "would be prejudiced by the introduction of evidence admissible against his
co-defendant, but inadmissible as to him .... " Id.
66. Id. at 171.
67. See id. at 170 (acknowledging the validity of Calder's fourth category prohibiting
laws that alter the rules of evidence).
68. Rockhill, supra note 58, at 1106.
69. Id.
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Weaver v. Graham was another example of the Court's "faith-
ful adherence" to Calder's ex post facto framework.7' The Court in
Weaver cited Calder several times and borrowed Justice Chase's
ex post facto analysis.72 Weaver involved a Florida statute that ef-
fectively reduced the accumulation of monthly "gain-time" credits
for prisoners who had already accumulated a set amount of cred-
its before the statute's enactment. 3 The prisoner-appellant al-
leged that the statute would require him to serve an additional
two years in excess of his original fifteen-year sentence.74 Answer-
ing the "critical question" at issue, the Court opined that the law
changed the legal consequences of acts completed before its effec-
tive date.75 The Court held that retroactive reduction of the avail-
ability of gain-time credits for prisoners had the effect of increas-
ing punishment, thereby fitting into Calder's third category.76
The Court's recent holding in Carmell v. Texas77 served as a
"resounding amplification" of the foregoing decisions, and of the
principles espoused in Calder in particular." Carmell dealt with
an amendment to a Texas "outcry" statute that considerably re-
laxed previous corroboration requirements for victims of sexual
abuse.79 Recognizing Calder's prohibition of laws altering the
70. 450 U.S. 24 (1981).
71. Rockhill, supra note 58, at 1107.
72. Weaver, 450 U.S. at 28-33.
73. Id. at 26-27. The original statute offered the following guidelines: -(a) Five days
per month off the first and second years of his sentence; (b) Ten days per month off the
third and fourth years of his sentence; and (c) Fifteen days per month off the fifth and all
succeeding years of his sentence.'" Id. at 26 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.27(1) (West
1975) (repealed 1978). The new statute reduced the benefits for prisoners: "(a) Three days
per month off the first and second years of the sentence; (b) Six days per month off the
third and fourth years of the sentence; and (c) Nine days per month off the fifth and all
succeeding years of the sentence.'" Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.275(1) (West 1979)).
74. Id. at 27.
75. Id. at 31.
76. Id. at 35-36 ("Thus, the new provision constricts the inmate's opportunity to earn
early release, and thereby makes more onerous the punishment for crimes committed be-
fore its enactment.").
77. 529 U.S. 513 (2000).
78. See Rockhill, supra note 58, at 1108.
79. Carmell, 529 U.S. at 517-19. Under the originally applicable statute, a child vic-
tim exception to the traditional corroboration requirement existed for victims under the
age of fourteen. Id. at 517. The exception allowed for a conviction based upon a young vic-
tim's testimony alone, without any corroborating evidence. Id. The amendment extended
the child victim exception to victims under eighteen years of age. Id. at 518. That amend-
ment was critical for four of the defendant's counts, since the victim was more than four-
teen years old at the time of the alleged offenses. Id. at 518-19. In short, the Court pro-
pounded that the validity of these four counts depended upon the application of the new
2004] 1021
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quantum of evidence necessary to convict as the ex post facto
category at issue,"' the Court "resurrected the fourth Calder cate-
gory... that lower courts considered shorn by Beazell .... ."" The
Court rejected the notion that the decision in Collins v.
Youngblood, 2 which cited the language of Beazell, had "effec-
tively cast out [Calder's] fourth category." 3 The State of Texas
pointed out a section in the Collins opinion quoting a passage
from Beazell that avoided any reference to alterations in the legal
rules of evidence-Calder's fourth category.' However, the Court
in Carmell offered additional language from Beazell that it felt
distinguished, rather than overruled, Calder's fourth category. 5
Decided in 2000, Carmell explained that Calder's four categories
had long been "embraced by contemporary scholars," 6 had been
labeled by the Court in Collins as the "exclusive definition" of ex
post facto laws,"7 and still constituted the modern standard upon
which to base an ex post facto determination.8
D. An Ex Post Facto Dilemma Emerges: Reviving Time-Barred
Criminal Prosecutions Through Legislative Extension of
Statutes of Limitations
The purpose of criminal statutes of limitations is two-fold: (1)
to protect the defendant from an unfair trial (due, possibly, to de-
teriorated evidence) and a potentially undeserved punishment;
and (2) to protect "society from unprosecuted offenders, by using
the sanction of preclusion to encourage law enforcement officials
law or the old law to the case, which further depended upon whether the new law violated
the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. at 519.
80. Id. at 532 (discussing how the Texas statute effectively reduced the quantum of
evidence required to convict). The Court admitted that "Calder's fourth category ad-
dresse[d] this concern precisely." Id.
81. Rockhill, supra note 58, at 1109.
82. 497 U.S. 37 (1990).
83. Carmell, 529 U.S. at 537. Responding to the claim that the Court in Collins had
eliminated Calder's fourth category, the Court emphasized that "Collins held no such
thing." Id.
84. Id. at 538 (citing Collins, 497 U.S. at 43 n.3).
85. Id. (pointing to Beazell's acknowledgement that "the law at issue in that case did
not change '[t]he quantum and kind of proof required to establish guilt.'" (quoting Beazell
v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 170 (1925)).
86. Id. at 524.
87. Id. at 538.
88. See id. at 552.
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to promptly investigate and prosecute crime." 9 However noble
their purpose may be, criminal statutes of limitations are not
mandatory; "they are solely a matter of legislative choice. Accord-
ingly, the time periods in these statutes can be changed at the
will of the legislature or can be eliminated entirely."'
1. Distinguishing Unexpired and Expired Statutes of Limitations
As a subtopic of ex post facto jurisprudence in the United
States, the modern trend of lengthening criminal statutes of limi-
tations has come to pose somewhat of a challenge to the judicial
system.91 To clarify, all federal circuits that have ruled on the is-
sue have upheld the constitutionality of extending an unexpired
criminal statute of limitations.92 The constitutional uncertainty
arises when a legislature enacts a statute permitting the revival
of a previously time-barred prosecution through the retroactive
lengthening of a criminal statute of limitations.93
2. Revived Prosecutions and the Calder Categories: One Size
Does Not Fit All
Shortly after its inception, the Supreme Court in Calder at-
tempted to devise a comprehensive list of categories of legislation
89. Adlestein, supra note 10, at 261-62; see also Andrew C. Bernasconi, Comment,
Beyond Fingerprinting: Indicting DNA Threatens Criminal Defendants' Constitutional and
Statutory Rights, 50 AM. U. L. REv. 979, 995 (2001) (mentioning, as part of the purpose for
a criminal statute of limitations, the preservation of a defendant's right "to assemble evi-
dence and prepare a vigorous defense").
90. Adlestein, supra note 10, at 250-51.
91. See Tanner, supra note 8, at 400 (opining that the practice of lengthening criminal
statutes of limitation falls within a "problem category").
92. United States v. Grimes, 142 F.3d 1342, 1351 (11th Cir. 1998) ("[AIll of the cir-
cuits ... have uniformly held that extending a limitations period before the prosecution is
barred does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause."); United States v. Taliaferro, 979 F.2d
1399, 1402 (10th Cir. 1992) ("[The application of an extended statute of limitations to of-
fenses occurring prior to the legislative extension, where the prior and shorter statute of
limitations has not run as of the date of such extension, does not violate the [E]x [Piost
[Flacto [Cilause."); United States v. Richardson, 512 F.2d 105, 106 (3d Cir. 1975) ("Con-
gress, of course, has the power to extend the period of limitations without running afoul of
the [E]x [Post [Flacto [Clause, provided the [original] period has not already run."). For a
more extensive list of federal cases that have ruled on the issue, see Tanner, supra note 8,
at 406 n.56.
93. See Tanner, supra note 8, at 407-09 (describing the difficulty of categorizing re-
vival prosecution statutes within Calder's framework, which resulted in the lack of a firm
constitutional rule on point).
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that would constitute ex post facto violations.94 Unfortunately for
the evolution of ex post facto jurisprudence, the Calder categories
were not "sufficiently detailed to allow for ready categorization of
every possible statute that might come before a court." 5 Deciding
how to fit a prosecution-reviving statute into one of Calder's cate-
gories exemplifies the difficulty inherent in ex post facto analysis
of statutes of limitations.96
3. A Historical Lack of Respect for Statutes of Limitations as a
Contributing Factor to Prosecution Revivals
Calder's categorization approach has served as a "stumbling
block" for courts attempting to label extensions of criminal stat-
utes of limitations within the Calder paradigms.97 Perhaps courts'
tendencies to blur the Calder analysis as applied to legislation ex-
tending criminal statutes of limitations can be attributed to a his-
torical lack of respect for criminal statutes of limitations. 98 The
existence of a criminal mens rea is irrelevant in determining the
applicability of a criminal statute of limitations as a defense to a
particular charge.99 That is to say, a statute of limitations might
render a guilty defendant immune from prosecution simply be-
cause of a theoretical lack of evidence due to the passage of time
rather than an actual lack of incriminating evidence or the requi-
site mental state.'00 Since this defensive tool is "completely sepa-
rate from the criminal nature of an act, many courts throughout
history accorded statutes of limitation little respect as a valid de-
fense."'0 ' Also, the English common law did not typically recog-
nize criminal statutes of limitations.' 2 Parliament very rarely
94. See supra Part II.B.1.-4.
95. Tanner, supra note 8, at 408.
96. See id. (explaining that the incompleteness of Calder's categories has resulted in
the denial of ex post facto protection to some defendants).
97. See id. at 400.
98. See id. at 405 (suggesting that many courts throughout history have not recog-
nized a defense based on the statute of limitations as valid).
99. See id. at 404-05.
100. See id. at 407. A "theoretical lack of evidence" should be taken to represent the
presumption that, as decades have passed, evidence deteriorates such that a defendant
would be unable to adequately defend himself or herself. See id.
101. Id. at 405.
102. Adlestein, supra note 10, at 253-54.
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promulgated statutes of limitations, and only for a limited num-
ber of crimes. °3
The criminal statute of limitations has been viewed throughout
history as a non-essential element of criminal justice not required
by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth114 or Fourteenth0 5
Amendments to the Constitution. By the end of the twentieth
century, states regularly manipulated criminal statutes of limita-
tions to address social concerns.' 6 The passage of Penal Code sec-
tion 803(g)' in 1993 by California's legislature tested the limits
of constitutionality by authorizing the revival of previously time-
barred criminal prosecutions.'0 8 Some California courts approved
of the constitutional validity of the new statute, even in cases
where a prosecution time-barred for many years had been re-
vived. 9 Other courts held that the statute could not be applied
retroactively without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause."0 The
Supreme Court of California resolved the split among the Cali-
fornia appellate circuits by holding in People v. Frazer"' that
statutory revival of a time-barred prosecution would withstand ex
post facto analysis." 2
Having "never squarely faced the problem" of criminal statutes
of limitations under the federal Ex Post Facto Clauses," 3 the Su-
preme Court of the United States granted certiorari in Stogner v.
California"4 in order to consider the constitutionality of reviving
a previously time-barred prosecution and to clarify modern ex
post facto jurisprudence." 5
103. Id. at 254.
104. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
105. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
106. See Adlestein, supra note 10, at 252.
107. CAL. PENAL CODE § 803(g) (West Supp. 2004).
108. The California legislature made this perfectly clear when it added a provision in
1996 explicitly stating that the statute "shall revive" a time-barred prosecution. Id. §
803(g)(3)(A). For a more detailed discussion of the statute, see infra Part III.A.
109. See, e.g., People v. Maloy, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 691, 700 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (arguing
that retroactive application would not necessarily offend the Ex Post Facto Clause).
110. See, e.g., People v. Sowers, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 250, 256 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (holding
that a statute extending a criminal limitations period could only lengthen an unexpired
limitations period).
111. 982 P.2d 180 (Cal. 1999).
112. Id. at 195-98.
113. Tanner, supra note 8, at 406.
114. 123 S. Ct. 2446 (2003).
115. See id. at 2449.
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III. HISTORY OF THE STOGNER CASE
A. The Impetus for California's Enactment of Penal Code
Section 803(g)
California's enactment of a prosecution-reviving statute "grew
out of an explosion of public awareness about sexual abuse that
began in the early 1980s ... .""' Around that time, legislatures
nationwide began to realize that child victims of sexual abuse
frequently refrain from reporting their abuse to authorities be-
cause "they are easily manipulated by offenders in positions of
authority and trust, and because children have difficulty remem-
bering the crime or facing the trauma it can cause."" 7 States that
limited the time for prosecuting child sex abuse cases began to
significantly augment the time period for filing charges after the
abuse.' These longer statutes of limitations were "based on the
apparent premise that both past and future sex crimes against
children would otherwise go largely unpunished.""9
Serious and violent crime rates in California had reached re-
cord levels by the early 1990s and were of great concern to the
state's citizens. 2 ° The nationally publicized kidnapping and mur-
der of twelve-year-old Polly Klaas by a repeat, violent sex of-
fender' 2 ' produced considerable societal momentum to call for
stricter criminal legislation.'22 The underlying concern over the
inability of young victims of sex crimes to come forward in a
timely manner prompted the California legislature to extend the
116. Richard Winton et al., Bans on Gay Sex Ruled Unconstitutional; California Moles-
tation Law Struck Down; Abuse: Hundreds of Convictions Will Be Tossed Out and Prosecu-
tions Dropped, Some Involving Priests, L.A. TIMES, June 27, 2003, at Al.
117. Frazer, 982 P.2d at 183-84.
118. Id. at 184.
119. Id.
120. James A. Ardaiz, California's Three Strikes Law: History, Expectations, Conse-
quences, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 1 (2000) (discussing the political and social factors influ-
encing California's legislature and voters); see also Rebecca Gross, Comment, The "Spirit"
of the Three Strikes Law: From the Romero Myth to the Hopeful Implications of Andrade,
32 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 169, 170-71 (2002) (describing specific criminal cases that
spurred the enactment of more strict criminal legislation).
121. See Gross, supra note 120, at 170 (pointing out that the murderer's prior convic-
tions were burglary, sexual assault on a woman, and abducting a woman and forcing her
to withdraw money from her bank account).
122. Id. at 170-71.
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statute of limitations for sex crimes against children, regardless
of whether or not the limitations period had already expired.
123
Under California Penal Code section 803(g),
a previously committed sex-related child abuse was subject to prose-
cution under the new limitations period on three conditions. First, a
victim of abuse must have reported the act to the police. Second, the
victim's allegations must be supported by clear and convincing evi-
dence. Third, prosecution of the victim's allegations must start
within a year of his or her report.
124
In 1996, California's legislature added a provision to clarify
that Penal Code section 803(g) revived crimes for which the stat-
ute of limitations had already expired.
125
B. Facts and Procedural History of Stogner
In 1998, two adult sisters were speaking to police officers in-
vestigating allegations of child abuse within the sisters' extended
family.'26 During their conversation, the sisters accused their fa-
ther of molesting them when they were children. 127 Later in 1998,
a California grand jury indicted Marion Stogner, the girls' father,
for sex-related crimes he allegedly perpetrated against his daugh-
ters from 1955 to 1973.128 At the time the crimes were allegedly
committed, the statute governing prosecutions set forth a three-
year statute of limitations, which had expired over twenty-two
years before Stogner's indictment in 1998.129
Stogner moved for the complaint's dismissal on the grounds
that the Ex Post Facto Clause disallowed the revival of a previ-
ously time-barred prosecution. 3 ° The trial court held that reviv-
ing a time-barred action was unconstitutional.' 3 ' The Court of
123. Frazer, 982 P.2d at 184.
124. Christine Kim, Note, Recent Court Decisions Impacting Juveniles, 7 U.C. DAVIS J.
Juv. L. & POLY 373, 393 (2003).
125. CAL. PENAL CODE § 803(g)(3)(A) (West Supp. 2004) ("This subdivision... shall re-
vive any cause of action barred by [prior statutes of limitations] ... .") (emphasis added).
126. Stout, supra note 56, at A16.
127. Id.
128. Stogner v. California, 123 S. Ct. 2446, 2449 (2003).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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Appeal of California reversed, citing People v. Frazer,132 a recent
and contrary decision by the Supreme Court of California. 133
Stogner moved to dismiss his indictment on the grounds that his
indictment violated both the Ex Post Facto Clause and the Due
Process Clause.' The trial court denied Stogner's motion, and
the Court of Appeal of California upheld the denial.135
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and
overruled the Court of Appeal of California.'36 In a five to four de-
cision written by Justice Breyer, 13 the Court held that "a law en-
acted after expiration of a previously applicable limitations period
violates the Ex Post Facto Clause when it is applied to revive a
previously time-barred prosecution." 38
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Majority Opinion
Revealing its conclusion in the first paragraph of its analysis,
the Court opined that the features of California Penal Code sec-
tion 803(g) produced the kind of retroactivity forbidden by the
Constitution.139 Justice Breyer based the first part of his analysis
on three observations that supported the Court's holding. First,
the statute at issue "threaten[ed] the kinds of harm that, in [the]
Court's view, the Ex Post Facto Clause [sought] to avoid." 4 ° Sec-
ond, the "statute [fell] literally within the categorical descriptions
of ex post facto laws set forth by Justice Chase ... in Calder v.
Bull."' Third, "numerous legislators, courts, and commentators
132. 982 P.2d 180 (Cal. 1999).
133. Stogner, 123 S. Ct. at 2449.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 2461.
137. Justice Breyer's opinion was joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and
Ginsburg. Id. at 2448.
138. Id. at 2461.
139. Id. at 2449. In particular, Justice Breyer referred to three problematic aspects of
the California statute: (1) its creation of a new criminal limitations period that extended
the time for prosecution; (2) its authorization of criminal prosecutions that were time-
barred; and (3) its enactment after prior limitations periods for Stogner's alleged offenses
had expired. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 2450.
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have long believed it well settled that the Ex Post Facto Clause
forbids resurrection of a time-barred prosecution." Justice
Breyer devoted the final part of his opinion to rebutting the dis-
sent's stern critique of the Court's holding.
43
1. Harm at Issue Prohibited by the Ex Post Facto Clause
The Court made it clear that California's statute threatened
the type of "'manifestly unjust and oppressive' retroactive effects"
prohibited by the Ex Post Facto Clause.1 44 The Court cited Judge
Learned Hand's observation that extending a limitations period
after a state "has assured 'a man that he has become safe from its
pursuit... seems to most of us unfair and dishonest.' '1 45 The
Court noted that in such a situation "the government has refused
'to play by its own rules,"'146 and "has deprived the defendant of
the 'fair warning' 47 that might have led him to preserve exculpa-
tory evidence.""4 Furthermore, allowing a legislature "to pick and
choose when to act retroactively, risks both 'arbitrary and poten-
tially vindictive legislation"' that is detrimental to the goals of a
democratic society.1 4
9
2. Fitting Within Calder's Ex Post Facto Framework
To begin the Court's Calder analysis, Justice Breyer explained
that the categorization approach Justice Chase conceived in Cal-
der v. Bull 5' is still an authoritative account of the Ex Post Facto
Clauses.'"' Justice Breyer paid particularly close attention to the
142. Id. at 2452. The Court focused its entire analysis on the ex post facto aspects of
Stogner's arguments. The majority's only mention of due process concerns was in a cita-
tion to an Oregon appellate court case, wherein the court held that a law resurrecting a
time-barred criminal case did violate the Due Process Clause. Id. at 2453 (citing State v.
Cookman, 873 P.2d 335, 338 (Or. Ct. App. 1994)).
143. For a discussion of the majority's response to the dissent, see infra Part V.C.
144. Stogner, 123 S. Ct. at 2449 (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 391
(1798)).
145. Id. (quoting Falter v. United States, 23 F.2d 420, 426 (2d Cir. 1928)).
146. Id. at 2450 (quoting Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 533 (2000)).
147. Id. (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 (1981)).
148. Id. (citation omitted).
149. Id. (quoting Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29).
150. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
151. Stogner, 123 S. Ct. at 2450 (citing Carmell, 529 U.S. at 539).
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second category involving laws that "aggravate[] a crime, or
make[] it greater than it was, when committed.""15 The Court rea-
soned that, in the context of Parliament's earlier abusive acts,
Justice Chase understood his second category to refer to the in-
fliction of punishment where the party was not, by law, liable to
that punishment to any degree.153 Justice Breyer interpreted Jus-
tice Chase's discussion of parliamentary practices as an alterna-
tive means of defining Calder's second category. 54 As applied to
Stogner's situation, after the original statute of limitations had
expired, Stogner was not liable to any punishment. The Court
held that California's new statute aggravated Stogner's crime be-
cause the law imposed a punishment for past criminal conduct
that was not subject to prosecution at the time the legislature
promulgated the new law. 55 The Court referred to a Supreme
Court of New Jersey case' 6 that dealt with a similar prosecution-
reviving statute in which the Court labeled Calder's second cate-
gory as an exact fit for the statute at issue.'
57
As a final piece of authority regarding the applicability of Cal-
der's second category to California's statute, the Court referenced
Justice Chase's discussion of certain Acts of Parliament. 5 ' Par-
liament sometimes passed laws banishing certain individuals ac-
cused of treason.159 However, those laws were enacted after the
crimes had been committed under circumstances where banish-
ment was not a form of penalty that could be imposed by the
courts. 6 ° That common law practice, like California's statute,
"enabled punishment where it was not otherwise available 'in the
ordinary course of law."""' This was the type of vice that, accord-
152. Id. (quoting Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 390).
153. Id. at 2450-51.
154. Id. at 2451 ("[Tlhis understanding is consistent, in relevant part, with Chase's
second category examples--examples specifically provided to illustrate Chase's alternative
description of laws 'inflict[ing] punishments, where the party was not, by law, liable to any
punishment."' (quoting Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 389) (citation omitted)).
155. Id.
156. Moore v. State, 43 N.J.L. 203, 217 (1881).
157. Stogner, 123 S. Ct. at 2451.
158. Id. at 2451-52.
159. Id. at 2451.
160. Id.
161. Id. (quoting 2 R. WOODDESON, A SYSTEMATICAL VIEW OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
638 (1792)).
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ing to the Court, corresponded with the purpose of Justice
Chase's second category of ex post facto laws. 162
Justice Breyer next explained that, in finding that California's
law fell within the terms of Calder's second category, the Court
was not denying that the law might fall within another cate-
gory.' 6 ' The Court discussed the likely applicability of Calder's
fourth category dealing with laws altering the legal rules of evi-
dence by diminishing "'the quantum of evidence required to con-
vict.""' The Court described a statute of limitations as "a legisla-
tive judgment that, after a certain time, no quantum of evidence
is sufficient to convict."'65 As the Court reasoned, that interpreta-
tion of the purpose of a statute of limitations rests on evidentiary
concerns that the passage of time causes memories to fade, evi-
dence to disappear, and witnesses to be unavailable. 166 Conse-
quently, reviving a time-barred prosecution eliminates the pre-
sumption that an act cannot be prosecuted, by allowing a person
to be convicted using a quantum of evidence that was legally in-
sufficient at the time the new law was enacted.'67 Arguably,
therefore, California's law fits into Calder's fourth category. 61
Nonetheless, the Court declined to hold that the law fit into Cal-
der's fourth category, because the statute satisfied Calder's sec-
ond category.'69
3. A "Long Line of Authority"
The Court's third source of support for its holding was a long
line of authority in the form of legislators, courts, and commenta-
tors. 7 ° For example, in the years following the Civil War, various
congressmen "rejected a bill that would have revived time-barred
162. Id.
163. Id. at 2452.
164. Id. (quoting Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 532 (2000)).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. ("[Tihe new law would 'violate' previous evidence-related legal rules by author-
izing the courts to 'receive evidence.., which the courts of justice would not [previously
have] admit[ted]' as sufficient proof of a crime." (citation omitted)).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 2452, 2455.
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prosecutions" for wartime treason. 171 In their minds, such legisla-
tive retroactivity "threatened an injustice tantamount to 'judicial
murder.""72 Additionally, the Court cited more than twenty state
supreme court decisions holding that the revival of time-barred
prosecutions violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.'73 Perhaps most
persuasive was the Court's observation that courts upholding ex-
tensions of unexpired statutes of limitations had consistently dis-
tinguished such statutes from prosecution-reviving statutes. 74
According to Justice Breyer, courts' efforts to distinguish unex-
pired statutes from expired statutes suggested "a presumption
that revival of time-barred criminal cases is not allowed."175
B. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Kennedy's lengthy dissent, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas, attacked virtually
every argument found in the majority opinion. 76 The dissent
based its critique primarily on alternative interpretations of
precedent, history, and policy issues.
177
171. Id. at 2452.
172. Id. at 2453 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (1866)).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. Supporting the historical presumption that reviving time-barred cases is not
allowed, the Court noted that courts at both federal and state levels have held that the
extension of existing limitations periods is not an ex post facto violation "provided," "so
long as," "because," or "if" the prior limitations periods have not expired. Id. As an exam-
ple of a federal court promoting this view, the Court cited, among others, United States v.
Madia, 955 F.2d 538, 540 (8th Cir. 1992) ("'Congress, of course, has the power to extend
the period of limitations without running afoul of the ex post facto clause, provided the
[original] period has not already run.' (second emphasis added) (quoting United States v.
Richardson, 512 F.2d 105, 106 (3d Cir. 1975))). The Court also offered examples of state
courts that used similar language:
There appears also to be widespread agreement that a legislative body can
extend the period of limitations as to criminal offenses which occurred prior
to the effective date of the change without violating the constitutional prohi-
bition against ex post facto laws, so long as the extended period does not ap-
ply to any case in which the accused has acquired, as of the effective date of
the change, a right to acquittal through the running of the original statute.
People v. Anderson, 292 N.E.2d 364, 366 (Ill. 1973) (second emphasis added). Logically,
the limiting words suggest that the legislation would be ex post facto if the prior limita-
tions period had already expired.
176. Stogner, 123 S. Ct. at 2461 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
177. See id. at 2461-72 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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1. Shoehorning into the Calder Framework
Justice Kennedy's first objection was that the Court tried to
force the California statute into Calder's second category when it
did not logically fit."8 According to Justice Kennedy, "[a] law
which does not alter the definition of the crime but only revives
prosecution does not make the crime 'greater than it was, when
committed.""79 The dissent argued that the Court's "long line of
authority" supporting its Calder categorization of the California
law was inadequate and misleading.' Justice Kennedy pointed
out that of the twenty-two cases the Court cited to support its in-
terpretation of Calder's second category, only four had to decide
whether a revival of expired prosecutions was constitutional-the
issue posed by Stogner 181 The dissent attempted to discredit the
importance of those four decisions by distinguishing them from
Stogner.' For example, Justice Kennedy noted the Court's reli-
ance on State v. Sneed,' which recognized that retroactively
lengthening a criminal statute of limitations had the effect of re-
viving the right of action and would be an ex post facto viola-
tion."s Justice Kennedy argued that Sneed's unreasoned three-
sentence-long analysis "scarcely support[ed] the majority's novel
interpretation of Calder's second category. 185
In Justice Kennedy's view, the Court has traditionally adhered
to an interpretation of Calder's second category that the major-
ity's analysis distorted.'86 The second category, the dissent ar-
gued, prohibited only "those retroactive statutes which 'affect the
criminal quality of the act charged [by] chang[ing] the legal defi-
nition of the offense.'"'8 7 The California statute, however, only
178. Id. at 2461. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
179. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
180. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The Court's list of precedents is less persuasive
than it may appear at a first glance." (citation omitted)).
181. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 2461-64 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy noted that the Court's
cited precedent "flatly contradict[s]" its own arguments. Id. at 2462 (Kennedy, J., dissent-
ing).
183. 25 Tex. 66 (1860).
184. Id. at 67.
185. Stogner, 123 S. Ct. at 2462 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 2465 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The Court's new definition not only distorts
the original meaning of the second Calder category, but also threatens the coherence of the
overall ex post facto scheme.").
187. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 170 (1925)).
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changed the time period during which Stogner could be prose-
cuted; it did not change the criminal quality of the offense. ' Fur-
thermore, the dissent opined that the majority's use of Calder's
"alternative description" of the second category could not be
viewed as classifying the California statute within the official
second category.' 89
2. Misreading the Relevant History
The dissent strongly disputed the Court's version of the British
parliamentary history to which Calder referred. Justice Kennedy
argued that the Court's use of banishments as an example of a
common law practice fitting within Calder's second category was
"not the most logical" explanation of history.9 ° Since Calder's sec-
ond category only concerns laws which change the nature of the
offense, subjecting the offender to increased punishment, the
Court's banishment discussion was simply untrue. 91 After all,
Parliament had the power to pass acts sanctioning banishment as
a punishment for treason. 9 2 "By law, then, a charge of high trea-
son would have made [individuals] liable to banishment, which is
inconsistent with [Calder's] formulation."'93 Overall, the dissent
felt that the majority's "misconstruction of [Calder's] historical
examples [took] the second category out of [the] logical contin-
uum."
194
3. Public Policy
The dissent's most passionate argument was, perhaps, its ap-
peal to public policy.' 95 To demonstrate that California's law was
188. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
189. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy went on to argue that Justice Chase
intended his "alternative description" of the second category to describe the category's his-
torical origins, not to provide a definitive description of the laws prohibited by the Ex Post
Facto Clause. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 2467 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
191. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
192. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
193. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 2469 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
195. See id. at 2469-72 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (describing several times the suffer-
ing, anguish, and intimidation of young victims of sexual crimes).
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not arbitrary or vindictive legislation as labeled by the majority,
the dissent emphasized the states' special concerns in addressing
child abuse, including the frequent and understandable delay in
reporting abuse.'96 As Justice Kennedy explained, the psychologi-
cal phenomenon of repressed memory is a concern "amply sup-
ported by empirical studies."'97 Both of Stogner's daughters re-
pressed their memories of abuse because of intimidation and fear
of the consequences-two valid reasons for delaying their accusa-
tions.
98
Additionally, the dissent denied the Court's assertion that the
California statute was "'unfair and dishonest' because it violated
the [sitate's initial assurance to [Stogner] that 'he ha[d] become
safe from its pursuit."" 99 Justice Kennedy refuted the Court's ar-
gument that the California law destroyed Stogner's reliance in-
terest.200 The dissent labeled it a "fictional construct"20 ' to imag-
ine "that criminals keep calendars so they can mark the day to
discard their records" supporting their defense.0 2
Finally, the dissent attempted to assuage concerns regarding
the adverse effect a revived prosecution would have on the integ-
rity and fairness of a criminal trial.20 3 The dissent argued that
concerns "about stale evidence [could] be addressed by the judge
and the jury, and by the requirement of proof beyond reasonable
doubt."2" 4 Furthermore, California's statute contained the addi-
tional safeguard of requiring the presentation of clear and con-
vincing evidence that independently corroborates the victim's al-
legations.20 5 Also, the general protection of the Due Process
Clause would prevent an oppressive prosecution.2 6
196. Id. at 2469-70 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The California statute can be explained
as motivated by legitimate concerns about the continuing suffering endured by the victims
of childhood abuse.").
197. Id. at 2470 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
198. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
199. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Falter v. United States, 23 F.2d 420, 426 (2d
Cir. 1928)).
200. See id. at 2470-71 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 2471 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 2470 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (opining that this concept "does not exist as
part of our traditions or social understanding").
203. Id. at 2471-72 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 2471 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
205. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 2472 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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Ending in a blistering tone, the dissent described the Court's
opinion as harming ex post facto jurisprudence as well as past
and future victims of child abuse.2 °7
C. The Majority's Rebuttal of the Dissent
In response to the dissent's criticism, the Court noted that the
dissent undertook the "Herculean effort to prove that it is not un-
fair, in any constitutionally relevant sense" to revive the prosecu-
tion of an individual who had effectively been granted legal am-
nesty nearly a generation earlier.2 °8 According to Justice Breyer,
the dissent failed in its efforts to support such a contention.2 °9
The Court found the dissent's reading of historical examples too
narrow, its list of case law unconvincing, and its discussion of
public policy misguided.21 °
1. Excessively Narrow Reading of History
The Court described the historical examples offered by the dis-
sent as inaccurate, incomplete, vague, redundant, and imperti-
nent.2 ' Although Parliament had the authority to punish treason
with banishment, that was not the common, ordinary practice.21 2
As such, the Court's banishment examples were instances where
an individual was punished "through legislation that subjected
him to punishment otherwise unavailable.., through 'the ordi-
nary course of law,'" just as Justice Chase had discussed in Cal-
der.2 ' Justice Chase's alternative descriptions of his categories
were still highly relevant in an ex post facto determination and
helped reveal a second category broad enough to include retroac-
tive statutory changes. 4
207. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The Court... disregards the interests of those vic-
tims of child abuse who have found the courage to face their accusers and bring them to
justice.").
208. Id. at 2455.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 2455-61.
211. Id. at 2455-58.
212. Id. at 2457.
213. Id. at 2456 (citing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 389 (1798)).
214. Id. at 2458.
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2. Ineffective Case Law
Although the dissent criticized the Court's case law as unim-
pressive, the Court reemphasized its primary case law argument:
"[C]ourts, 'with apparent unanimity until California's decision in
Frazer, have continued to state' that 'laws reviving time-barred
prosecutions are ex post facto' and, 'when necessary, so to hold.' 218
Justice Breyer then argued that the dissent did not cite a single
case outside of California that held or even suggested a contrary
holding.216 After explaining that the reasoning in cases from ear-
lier centuries need not be perfectly consistent with modern con-
ceptions of how legal analysis should proceed, the Court reiter-
ated its most powerful observation-"the unanimity of judicial
views that the kind of statute [at issue was] ex post facto."21 7
3. Predominating Constitutional Interests
In response to the dissent's public policy arguments, the Court
argued that, although the state's interest in prosecuting child
abuse cases is important, there is "a predominating constitutional
interest in forbidding the State to revive a long-forbidden prose-
cution."218 Contrary to the dissent's contention that the statute
was fair, the Court pointed to the inherent injustice in failing to
notify an accused of the need to preserve exculpatory evidence as
decades pass. 2 9 As the Court reasoned, "[m]emories fade, and
witnesses can die or disappear."22 ° Also, in response to the dis-
sent's discussion of repressed memories, the Court emphasized
that faulty recovered memories, "nonetheless lead to prosecutions
that destroy families."221
Unfazed by the dissent's extreme criticism and skepticism, the
Court reiterated its holding that a law enacted after the expira-
tion of a previously applicable limitations period violates the Ex
Post Facto Clause when applied to revive a time-barred prosecu-
tion.222
215. Id. (quoting id. at 2453).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 2460.
218. Id. at 2461.
219. Id. at 2460.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 2461.
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE STOGNER DECISION
In the aftermath of the decision, the ability of state and federal
governments to pursue and punish sexual offenders has moved
even deeper into the public light amid national controversy.22 3
Stogner reached the Supreme Court at a time when widespread
allegations of child molestation by Roman Catholic priests were
bringing sharp attention to the issue of revival prosecutions.224
Drawing more attention to the issue was the November 2003 kid-
napping and disappearance of North Dakota college student Dru
Sjodin, which shocked the nation when the primary suspect
turned out to be a career sex offender who had been released from
prison just months earlier.22 5 For people indignant at the notion
that a recidivist sex offender could be released and commit new
crimes, the notion that an individual accused of sexually abusing
children could be immune from prosecution solely due to the pas-
sage of time might be equally offensive.
At face value, the controversy surrounding the Stogner decision
derives from its restrictive effects on the prosecution of child sex-
ual abuse.226 However, Stogner also has tremendous implications
for the prosecution of many other kinds of crimes, and for laws
and practices across the country.227
223. Compare Winton et al., supra note 116, at Al (calling Stogner a "devastating loss"
for victims of child abuse and a "terrible blow" to justice), with Smith & Berry, supra note
18 (mentioning how defense attorneys "celebrated [the] political ramifications" of the deci-
sion).
224. See Stout, supra note 56, at A16 ("The case has been closely watched because of its
implications in prosecuting priests accused of molesting children many years ago, as well
as its potential repercussions for other crimes.").
225. See Chuck Haga et al., A Red Flag on Rodriguez, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Dec.
13, 2003, at Al (describing the State Corrections Commissioner's "shocked" reaction that
Rodriguez was released rather than civilly committed).
226. See Smith & Berry, supra note 18 (quoting a San Francisco Assistant District At-
torney who characterized Stogner's effect on child sexual abuse cases as a "tidal wave").
227. See Stout, supra note 56, at A16 (explaining Stogner's effects above and beyond
the prosecution of child sex abuse); see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondent at 1-2, Stogner v. California, 123 S. Ct. 2446 (2003) (No. 01-1757)
[hereinafter Amicus Curiae], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2002/3mer/
lami/2001-1757.mer.ami.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2004) (outlining the adverse impact
Stogner may have on several existing and proposed pieces of federal legislation). As the
United States noted, "[blecause federal legislation is subject to ex post facto and due proc-
ess limits that parallel the limits on state legislation, the decision in this case could affect
the constitutionality of a recent Act of Congress and constrict Congress's authority to en-
act similar legislation." Id. at 2. The recent act to which the brief referred was the Uniting
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Ob-
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A. What Stogner Does Not Impact
As a preliminary matter, though highly influential, Stogner left
certain aspects of ex post facto jurisprudence untouched. Two
such aspects are the permissibility of extending unexpired stat-
utes of limitations and the continued validity of seeking civil
damages in cases where the criminal statute of limitations has
run.
Stogner has no impact on statutes that allow for extensions of
unexpired criminal statutes of limitations.228 Cases decided sub-
sequent to Stogner have acknowledged this distinction, allowing
states to enhance their efforts to prosecute criminals, while also
recognizing the constitutional limitations on such actions.229
Also, Stogner does not foreclose on a victim's ability to recover
civil damages from an accused long after the alleged abuse oc-
curred.23 ° With the threat of criminal prosecution now removed in
older sexual cases, a civil action can be a tool for retribution, re-
stricting an accused individual's monetary rights, even if his per-
sonal liberty still remains.231 Considering that more than three
struct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
Id. at 1-2. The similar legislation included pending congressional attempts "to eliminate
the statute of limitations for child abduction and felony sexual offenses and to toll statutes
of limitations in any felony case in which the perpetrator is identified through DNA evi-
dence." Id. at 2.
228. Stogner v. California, 123 S. Ct. 2446, 2453 (2003).
229. See, e.g., Minton v. State, No. 48A02-0301-CR-22, 2004 Ind. App. LEXIS 151, at
*9-10 (Ind. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2004) ("In Stogner, the amended statute revived the defen-
dant's previously time-barred prosecution. Here, the statute of limitation for Minton's of-
fenses had not yet run when the 1993 amendment extended the time period for prosecu-
tion. Even the Stogner court approved the amendment of a limitation period in this
context."); State v. Steele, No. C-020693, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 6099, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App.
Dec. 12, 2003) ("Since this case involves the extension of an unexpired statute of limita-
tions, not the resurrection of an expired one, Stogner by its own language does not ap-
ply."); State v. Lyles, 858 So. 2d 35, 56 (La. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2003) (arguing that the rea-
soning in Stogner was not controlling since the defendant committed the crime after the
Louisiana statute of limitations had been increased).
230. See Jean Guccione & William Lobdell, Law Spurred Flood of Sex Abuse Suits;
Hundreds Filed Claims in One-Year Window for Old Cases. Up to 800 People Target Dio-
ceses in State, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2004, at Al (explaining that civil cases "took on more
public significance" this past summer after Stogner precluded some criminal prosecutions);
Winton et al., supra note 116, at Al (indicating that Stogner has no impact on civil dam-
age lawsuits brought against priests stemming from earlier abuse).
231. See The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Leading Cases, supra note 13, at 276; see
also Guccione & Lobdell, supra note 230, at Al (mentioning an alleged victim of child sex-
ual abuse who claimed that the Stogner decision "'left [her] with no options' for justice"
other than a civil suit).
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hundred Catholic priests have either resigned or retired because
of allegations of sexual abuse, Catholic dioceses nationwide must
remain ready to defend against civil suits alleging that abuse oc-
curred decades ago.232 The Court suggested that civil actions are
limited by the Ex Post Facto Clause, but the majority failed to
provide specific examples, leaving that issue open to future legis-
lative and judicial interpretation.233
B. What Stogner Does Impact
1. Freeing Incarcerated Inmates and Ending Pending
Prosecutions
The most obvious effect Stogner has on the realm of criminal
justice is that it has resulted in the release of hundreds of prison-
ers and the termination of hundreds of prosecutions.2 34 For exam-
ple, in California, prosecutors and defenders have been striving to
sift through their case files to identify all defendants or inmates
affected by Stogner.2 35 One tool prosecutors might use to avoid the
release of certain inmates is to pursue other charges for which
the relevant statute of limitations has not yet expired.2 36 For de-
fense attorneys whose clients were already sentenced under the
now-unconstitutional statute, habeas corpus petitions appear to
be the most likely response to Stogner.3 7
2. A Blow to "Repressed Memory" Advocates
The issue of repressed memories has become a highly relevant
topic in criminal law over the past two decades as the number of
232. See Court Upholds Statute of Limitations, NEWSDAY (New York), June 27, 2003, at
A21; see also Guccione & Lobdell, supra note 230, at Al (describing multimillion-dollar
settlements that have been reached with dioceses across the nation).
233. Stogner, 123 S. Ct. at 2460 ("[Tlhe dissent goes beyond our prior statements of
what is constitutionally permissible even in the analogous civil context."). To support this
argument, the Court cited Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 312 n.8
(1945). Id. Donaldson recognized that the extension of a civil statute of limitations period
that has expired may be unconstitutional because it violates a "vested right." See
Donaldson, 325 U.S. at 312 n.8.
234. See Smith & Berry, supra note 18.
235. Id.
236. Id. ("[Prosecutors] may be able to salvage some [old cases] that appear to be eligi-
ble for dismissal if there are other charges where the statute of limitations had not ex-
pired.").
237. See id.
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psychological studies analyzing this phenomenon has increased
dramatically.23 Advocates of repressed memory syndrome claim
that it is a real and common result of trauma that should not be
employed as a mode of escaping prosecution.239 Their principal
argument has been that overwhelming senses of fear and shame
often prevent younger abuse victims from coming forward until
they are older, more confident, and more emotionally secure.24 °
Additionally, advocates argue that victims often do not come for-
ward with allegations until they learn that others have been sub-
jected to the same abuse.2 4' The most convincing argument for re-
pressed memory advocates is perhaps specific instances where
not respecting repressed memories results in the type of injustice
that shocks one's conscience.242
Opponents of the concept believe that there is too great a risk
of false memory syndrome, where therapists actually implant
false memories, indistinguishable from real ones.2 43 Even if not
intentionally implanted in the minds of alleged abuse victims by
238. See generally Lynn Holdsworth, Is It Repressed Memory with Delayed Recall or Is
It False Memory Syndrome? The Controversy and Its Potential Legal Implications, 22 L. &
PSYCHOL. REV. 103 (1998) (detailing the controversy surrounding repressed memories).
239. See Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association, National Associa-
tion of Counsel for Children, American Professional Society on the Abuse of Children, and
California Professional Society on the Abuse of Children in Support of Respondent, at 13-
25, Stogner v. California, 123 S. Ct. 2446 (2003) (No. 01-1757), available at http://su
preme.usatoday.findlaw.com/supreme-courtbriefs/01-1757/01-1757.mer.ami.apa.pdf (last
visited Mar. 30, 2004) [hereinafter Amici Curiae American Psychological Association et al.]
(explaining the numerous reasons victims do not report childhood sexual abuse, the long-
lasting devastating effects of childhood sexual abuse, and the threat child molesters pose
to children throughout their lives).
240. See id. at 7.
241. Id, at 8. This notion is consistent with the facts of Stogner, as Marion Stogner's
two adult daughters did not make their abuse allegations until they learned of similar
abuse elsewhere within their family. Stogner v. California, 123 S. Ct. 2446, 2470 (2003)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
242. See Amici Curiae American Psychological Association et al., supra note 239, at 9.
The amici curiae brief included several victims' accounts from public safety hearings. Id.
One example described a thirty-seven-year-old woman who reported being molested by her
father between the ages of five and seventeen. Id. Her allegations were corroborated by
siblings, and her father tacitly admitted his guilt to law enforcement. Id. However, the
statute of limitations prevented prosecuting the father. Id. Another instance involved a
fifty-six-year-old man who kept a journal entitled My Erotic Experiences with Beautiful
Little Girls. Id. The journal graphically described sexual encounters with children over a
twenty-year period. Id, Law enforcement officials found nine victims describing abuse
"strikingly similar" to the acts recounted in the journal. Id. Nevertheless, the man was
sentenced to only sixteen months in prison, because only one of the victims was abused
within the limitations period. Id.
243. Holdsworth, supra note 238, at 107.
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psychotherapists, memories are prone to errors in perception, re-
tention, and retrieval.2" As skeptics of repressed memories argue,
because of the often lengthy duration between perception and re-
call of memories of past sexual abuse, such recollections are eas-
ily distorted.245 Critics of the repressed memory phenomenon
have conceded the existence of some "extremely convincing evi-
dence pertaining to the reality of the.., phenomenon."2 46 They
argue, however, that advocates have not sufficiently proven the
phenomenon's accuracy such that it can be consistently and relia-
bly used as evidence in courts.247
Prior to Stogner, courts were divided as to how to handle the
admissibility of claims of childhood sexual abuse recalled years
after the statute of limitations had run.2 48 Now, the Supreme
Court has recognized the dangers of validating repressed memo-
ries as justification for reviving a prosecution, and has effectively
precluded their use in many criminal prosecutions.249 Stogner
presents a significant obstacle to the prospects of success in
criminal litigation for advocates promoting the evidentiary le-
gitimacy of repressed memories.
3. A Limit on DNA Evidence
The use of DNA evidence is another modern trend in criminal
law affected by Stogner. DNA evidence has emerged as "an in-
credibly useful tool in solving crimes and resolving questions of
identity."25 ° When the accuracy of DNA matching became appar-
ent, law enforcement officials and victims' advocates nationwide
began urging legislation to extend or eliminate criminal statutes
of limitations so that, when the money was found to process DNA
samples and make comparisons, the alleged perpetrator could be
244. See id. at 115-16.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 128.
247. Id. at 128-29.
248. Id. at 129.
249. See Stogner v. California, 123 S. Ct. 2446, 2460 (2003).
250. Bernasconi, supra note 89, at 1001; see also Mark Ballard, Several States Are Re.
pealing Some Statutes of Limitations, Saying DNA Evidence Now Makes Justice Possible,
MIAMI DAiLY Bus. REV., June 30, 2003, at 11 (quoting New York Governor George Pataki
touting DNA as '"a powerful crime-fighting tool that helps convict the guilty, exonerate the
innocent and bring justice for victims'" of abuse or other violent crimes).
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prosecuted.2"' Unfortunately for victims' advocates, due to the
cost and delay in obtaining samples, DNA evidence often comes
after the relevant statute of limitations has expired.25 2 Since
Stogner did not carve out an exception for DNA evidence, it ap-
pears that even near-perfect reliability in linking a defendant to a
crime will be insufficient to justify reviving a time-barred prose-
cution.253
4. Weakening the USA Patriot Act
The Court in Stogner made clear that "a constitutional princi-
ple must apply not only in child abuse cases, but in every crimi-
nal case."25 4 While initial reactions to Stogner probably would not
have conjured up images of terrorism, the Court's decision ex-
tends to all pieces of retroactive criminal legislation, even the
USA Patriot Act 55 aimed at thwarting and punishing terrorist ac-
tivities. Realizing Stogner's potentially adverse impact on federal
anti-terrorism legislation, the Bush administration filed a brief
asking the Supreme Court to uphold California's law.256 The brief
argued that the United States had "a substantial interest in the
resolution" of Stogner 7 One of the main purposes of the brief
was to warn the Court that overruling the California law could
imperil several aspects of the USA Patriot Act, which had elimi-
nated an existing eight-year time limit on prosecuting terrorism
cases involving death or serious bodily injury. Section 809 of
the Act is titled boldly, "No Statute of Limitation for Certain Ter-
rorism Offenses."2 9 In relevant part, the Act, which amended
previous statutory provisions regarding terrorism, states:
251. See Ballard, supra note 250, at 11 (presenting the view of some victims' advocates
that "[t]here's no reason to maintain a statute of limitations with this new [DNA] science.
The law must catch up with the science").
252. Id. See generally Bernasconi, supra note 89, at 998-1003 (discussing the history
and modern application of statutes of limitations to DNA evidence).
253. Ballard, supra note 250, at 11.
254. Stogner, 123 S. Ct. at 2460.
255. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (2001) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3286 (2000)).
256. Amicus Curiae, supra note 227, at 1-2, 30.
257. Id. at 1.
258. Charles Lane & Edward Walsh, Court Strikes Down California Law That Lifted
Statute of Limitations, WASH. POST, June 27, 2003, at A17.
259. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3286 (West
Supp. 2003).
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§ 3286. Extension of statute of limitation for certain terrorism of-
fenses
b) No Limitation.-Notwithstanding any other law, an indictment
may be found or an information instituted at any time without limi-
tation for any offense listed in section 2332b(g)(5)(B), if the commis-
sion of such offense resulted in, or created a foreseeable risk of,
death or serious bodily injury to another person. 26 0
A statutory note accompanying the text states, "The amend-
ments made by this section shall apply to the prosecution of any
offense committed before, on, or after the date of the enactment of
this section."26
1
The United States Department of Justice has been reviewing
the Stogner decision over the past few months to determine the
manner in which the USA Patriot Act will be affected.262 Amend-
ing the Act to make it comport with Stogner's holding is one op-
tion for the federal government, but that would limit its potency
as an effective anti-terrorism tool. International terrorism often
involves complex web-conspiracies, years in the making, which
take a considerable amount of time to unravel in federal investi-
gations. In light of the exceedingly difficult nature of locating and
prosecuting terrorists, Stogner will, at the very least, be a frus-
trating impediment to the federal government's "War on Terror"
in the future.
VI. CONCLUSION
Any decision resulting in the immediate exoneration of child
sex abusers will inevitably draw heavy criticism from many
sources. However, the Court's decision in Stogner signifies more
than its natural effect of immunizing some guilty individuals
from prosecution-it stands for the proposition that constitutional
considerations are always a predominating interest in judicial
analyses.263 The Court emphasized a potential criminal defen-
dant's fundamental need to preserve exculpatory evidence, which
cannot be effectively maintained when a prosecution commences
260. Id. (emphasis added).
261. Id.
262. Winton et al., supra note 116, at Al.
263. Stogner, 123 S. Ct. at 2461.
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after amnesty effectively has been granted.21 While society's in-
terests in punishing past criminal wrongdoing are undoubtedly
important, the Court in Stogner implied that society's injuries,
perhaps, "do not fester unendingly."265
After Stogner, the expiration of a criminal statute of limitations
marks a point where the accused person's constitutional rights
seemingly trump the alleged victim's entitlement to retribution.266
Although the Court did not definitively rule upon civil statutes of
limitations, its message in the criminal arena was perfectly clear:
Retroactive criminal justice must have constitutional limits. Long
clouded by disparate treatment in lower courts, ex post facto ju-
risprudence on revived prosecutions rings clearer now in the judi-
cial system.
Ryan D. Frei
264. Id.
265. The Supreme Court 2002 Term-Leading Cases, supra note 13, at 277.
266. See Kim, supra note 124, at 396.
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